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Abstract
Traditionally, researchers have claimed (e.g., Fillmore 198, Gillon 2006) that some verbs (such as eat and
bake) lexically allow Implicit Objects (IOs) whereas other verbs (devour, kill) do not. This lexical idiosyncrasy
is thought to explain why I at __ and I baked __ sound more natural than I devoured __ and I killed __. Other
authors (e.g., Resnik 1993, Goldberg 2001, Scott 2006) have tried to explain such contrasts in a more
principled way by exploring how IOs interact with discourse and information structure. In particular, they
have observed that a verb’s object must be “recoverable” in the discourse in order to be omitted. In this paper, I
explore two prongs of this “recoverability” criterion. As the first prong, I argue that “recoverability” is a matter
of degree; some objects can be recovered with more precision than others. I show that a given context’s
standard of “recoverability” is pegged to the speakers’ goals and interests, so that an IO can be only loosely
recoverable when it does not bear on speakers’ goals, but must be more precisely recoverable when it is
important. Turning to the second prong, I argue that an IO’s “recoverability” depends on the common ground
of a particular community. For example, since athletes routinely lift weights, it’s part of their common ground
that I lifted __ tends to mean I lifted weights. I report a simply corpus study showing that in communities
where the action denoted by a given verb is associated with a routine action with a predictable object, as with
lifting weights for athletes, the verb is more likely to appear with an IO. In both of these ways, I show that
speakers’ interests and shared knowledge can help to explain the apparent idiosyncrasy surrounding English
IOs.
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1 Introduction
“Implicit object” (IO) is a name for what happens when a verb we normally consider transitive
appears without an object:
(1) a. Teresa baked ; Phil ate ; Sharese read .
In English, researchers have long observed that some verbs allow IOs whereas others do not.
The most well-known minimal pair is is:
(2) a. Phil ate.
b. *Phil devoured.
Traditionally, such contrasts have been analyzed as lexical idiosyncrasy, so that the lexical entry
of eat specifies that it allows IOs while that of devour specifies that it does not. More recent work,
however, has attempted to explain such data in terms of pragmatics and discourse information. For
example, it’s often argued that the content of an IO need to be “recoverable” in the discourse context
(e.g., Resnik, 1993; Goldberg, 2001) In this paper, I examine two factors that contribute to this
criterion of recoverability.
First, I argue that recoverability is a matter of degree. At a minimum, one simply knows that an
object exists; at a maximum, one knows exactly what it is; and there is plenty of middle ground in
between. For an object to be omissible, it must be sufficiently recoverable along this continuum for
speakers to pursue their communicative goals in the context. Second, I argue that a given object may
easier to recover, and thus easier to omit, against the common ground of a particular community of
practice in the sense of Eckert and McConell-Ginet (1992): A group of people who unite to pursue
a common goal, such as a swim team or a law firm. I perform a few preliminary corpus studies to
show that the same verb may appear with IOs in one community of practice more than others; for
example, lift is more often used with an IO (understood as weights) in fitness magazines compared
to a general corpus. By considering both speakers’ goals and the community’s common ground, I try
to elaborate the criterion that an IO must be “recoverable,” because I think this criterion can explain
a great deal of the messy data surrounding English IOs.
Of course, some data will remain messy. Presumably Chinese speakers and English speakers
are just as good at recovering information from the context, yet only Chinese speakers can omit the
object of want; Bu yao (NEG WANT) means I don’t want it in Chinese, but the English Don’t want
is quite unnatural. However, while discourse factors cannot explain every constraint on IOs, I will
show that these factors can explain at least some of the data.
I’ll sketch the scope of these data before I turn to the analysis. Although the literature (e.g.,
Fillmore, 1986) distinguishes between “indefinite” and “definite” IOs, I have some qualms about
this distinction, which I elaborate in Section 4 (see also AnderBois, 2012; Scott, 2006). Therefore,
I consider data from both sides of this distinction. However, I limit myself to IOs that seem to
stand in for DP’s (rather than CP’s). I also don’t take a stand on whether IOs are represented in the
semantics, as in e.g., AnderBois 2012, or whether the verbs are simply intransitive (λx.ate(x)) and
a patient argument (the thing eaten) is pragmatically inferred (as in Recanati, 2007); the term “IO”
is descriptive only.
1.1 Literature: Lexical Views vs. Discourse Views
Some researchers argue that whether a verb allows an IO or not hinges on its lexical entry, whereas
others argue that it depends on how important or informative a verb’s object is in the discourse
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context. Here, I briefly introduce both views, suggesting that the more flexible discourse-oriented
view can better handle the data.
Since eat and devour both describe consumption, it may appear difficult to explain why eat
allows an IO while devour does not on semantic grounds alone. Instead, one may have to posit
idiosyncrasy in the lexicon. Many other pairs of verbs pattern in the same way. Gillon (2006)
provides a list building on that of Fillmore (1986):
Allows IOs No IOs Allows IOs No IOs
follow pursue suppose maintain
leave vacate try attempt
arrive reach promise pledge
look seek find out discover
insist demand object oppose
Like eat and devour, these minimal pairs have also been analyzed as lexically idiosyncratic
(e.g., Fillmore, 1986; Gillon, 2006) and thus unpredictable. In this paper, however, I try to see how
far we can get if we assume that these apparent idiosyncrasies have predictable sources.
A more predictive lexical analysis is proposed by Rappaport Hovav and Levin (1998) and Rap-
paport Hovav (2008). They distinguish manner verbs from result verbs and propose that result verbs
do not allow IOs. Manner verbs describe the manner in which an action is carried out, but not its
result; for example, run, stab and fly specify a type of movement but not a consequence thereof.
Result verbs describe the result of an action but not the manner in which it takes place; for example,
arrive, kill and ascend specify a change from not present to present, alive to dead, low to high, but
not the manner in which this change was brought about. Since result verbs describe a change, Rap-
paport Hovav argues that the entity affected by this change must be present in the sentence, meaning
that IOs are not allowed for result verbs (and may or may not be allowed for manner verbs). This
analysis explains why, for example, He hunted does not need an object, but He killed sounds strange
without one.
Such lexical analyses presuppose, however, that verbs can be clearly distinguished into those
that allow IOs and those that do not. In fact, this distinction does not seem to be categorical. For
almost every verb that is not supposed to allow IOs in the list above, I have found an example from
the Web (indicated by [W]; via Google searches conducted between March and July 2013) in which
it does appear with an IO. (To foreshadow, it’s interesting that many of these surprising attestations,
e.g., (4, 5, 8, 10, 12), seem to come from specific communities in which that verb might be especially
significant.)
(3) For dinner we let our little three year old choose. His request, chips and salsa. So off to
Chili’s we went. He devoured. Then we ordered a molten cake. ([W], mom’s blog)
(4) Officers pursue because they believe the person they are trying to stop must present a serious
threat ([W], police forum)
(5) Divorce raised its (not so) ugly head and they vacated at the end of the lease. ([W], invest-
ment blog)
(6) But if you see what I see, if you feel as I feel, and if you would seek as I seek . . . then I ask
you to stand beside me (V for Vendetta)
(7) Because I can’t accept myself, I demand all the time. In all my relationships I demand, and
no relationship is ever lasting. . . ([W], teen website)
(8) Putting on weight now that I’m trying to maintain . . . ([W], diet blog)
(9) I attempted and failed miserably, only because I forgot that Sunday was the Sept. 2nd.
([W], site proposing a day where people don’t go online)
(10) Pledges belong in the same ensemble of church practices as prayer, study, worship, ser-
vice. . . But unless you pledge . . . none of this is possible. ([W], ellipsis in original; church
website)
(11) We are all human and we’re always discovering. (self-help website)
(12) Government teams will conclude, ‘Therefore, we are proud to propose.’. . . , Opposition
teams often say, ‘Therefore, we are proud to oppose. ([W], Parliamentary Debate website)
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Moreover, as Goldberg (2001) points out, even though result verbs are generally less acceptable
with IOs than manner verbs are, result verbs productively allow IOs in certain semantic contexts. For
example, many result verbs sound fine with IOs in generic statements, modal statements (which I add
to Goldberg’s list), repeated actions, infinitives, emphasis (which Goldberg calls “strong affective
stance”) and contrastive focus:
(13) Tigers only kill at night. generic (p. 506)
(14) Dresses I would murder for modal [W]
(15) Scarface killed again. repeated action (p. 507)
(16) The singer always aimed to please/impress infinitive (p. 506)
(17) Why would they give this creep a light prison term? He murdered!! emphasis (p. 513)
(18) He burglarized, but she murdered! contrastive focus (p. 514)
From a lexical perspective, both the Web data and Goldberg’s observations come as a surprise.
If a verb is not supposed to allow IOs, whether because its lexical entry stipulates as much, or
because it is a result verb, then it should not allow IOs under any circumstances. Thus, it seems that
a lexical analysis cannot fully explain when and why verbs allow IOs or not. Instead, it is useful to
consider the data from a more flexible discourse-oriented perspective.
One such discourse-centered analysis comes from Goldberg (2001), who argues that IOs are
allowed when a verb’s object is “low in discourse prominence.” In the IO-friendly contexts Gold-
berg identifies, she suggests that the verb is placed in the informational foreground while the object
is backgrounded. By omitting the objects of these verbs, the speaker emphasizes the important in-
formation and leaves out the rest. For example, in the contrastive focus and emphatic contexts, the
speaker seems upset that the person in question murdered anyone at all, but may not care specifi-
cally who was murdered. Thus, the speaker can omit the object of murder to emphasize only the
information she finds important.
A different sort of discourse-oriented analysis comes from Resnik (1993). He shows that the
verbs that allow IOs are those whose objects are more statistically predictable than the verbs that do
not. For example, eat provides more information about its object than need does, both intuitively,
as one generally eats food of some sort, but one could need anything from a glass of water to brain
surgery, and statistically, using Resnik’s measurement of “selectional strength.” Since eat provides
more information about its object than need does, the object of eat is easier to recover than that of
need, explaining why eat allows IOs whereas need does not. While Resnik’s explanation does focus
on qualities of particular lexical items, a given verb’s selectional strength, his analysis hinges on
how easily a hearer can recover an IO, a criterion that is inherently situated in a discourse.
In the data above, we see that verbs that are not supposed to allow IOs actually do allow them.
In particular, surprising uses of IOs appear in Web data, especially from specific communities of
practice, and in the semantic contexts noted by Goldberg. As I mentioned, these surprising uses
of IOs are hard to capture on a purely lexical account which states that certain verbs should cate-
gorically disallow IOs. For example, since kill and murder are result verbs, it’s surprising to find
them with IO’s in (13–18) if result verbs are not supposed to allow IOs. Instead, I have suggested
that these data are better understood from a more flexible discourse perspective, in which IOs are
allowed when the verb’s object can be inferred in context and is not crucial to the discourse.
Next, I try to elaborate this perspective by exploring two issues related to recoverability. First,
in Section 2, I discuss how the required degree of recoverability depends on interlocutors’ goals. I
suggest that this gradient view of recoverability helps to make sense of Goldberg’s data. Second, in
Section 3, I explore how an object may be more recoverable against the background of a particular
community of practice. Essentially reproducing Resnik’s finding within particular communities, I
suggest that specific verbs “select” or predict their objects more strongly within a particular commu-
nity, making it easier to recover that object. This idea, I argue, helps to make sense of some of the
web data above, in which IOs appeared on websites for specific communities of practice for whom
that verb has a predictable object.
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2 Recoverability is a Matter of Degree
In this section, I argue that whether an IO is “recoverable” or not is not a yes-or-no question, but a
matter of degree; and further, that how recoverable an object must be to license an IO is determined
by the interlocutors’ goals.
2.1 Degrees of Recoverability and Speakers’ Goals
Although it’s commonly said (e.g., AnderBois, 2012; Goldberg, 2001) that an IO must be “recover-
able,” it’s not always clear what that means. For every IO, we at least know that it must exist; we
know that one can’t eat without eating something. We even know that the IO must be some sort of
plausible object for the verb: if Mary ate, she probably ate something edible, not a democracy or a
bookcase. We might make inferences based on the subject as well: if Mary is a tiger, she probably
ate a different sort of food than if she were a human. Therefore, it seems that all IOs are recoverable
in some minimal sense. Beyond these inferences, however, we may not know anything more spe-
cific. Except in some context where quinoa is the only food available or the only one Mary eats, we
will not infer from Mary ate that Mary ate quinoa. Thus, all IOs are recoverable in a rough sense,
but some are not recoverable in detail.
From this perspective, recoverability seems like a vacuous criterion. It does not explain, for
example, why Mary ate sounds better than Mary devoured, because we can infer that May ate some
existing, devour-able thing just as we can infer that Mary ate some existing, edible thing. In order
to make recoverability meaningful, then, we need some way of fixing a standard for what counts as
“recoverable” enough.
To find a motivated standard for recoverability, I suggest that we consider what speakers want
to achieve in their conversation. Conversations, Roberts (1996) argues, are structured around “Ques-
tions Under Discussion” (QUD): questions that interlocutors are pursuing together. While Roberts
argues that the ultimate goal of a conversation is to answer “the Big Question”: “What is the way
things are?”, I prefer to think that the ultimate goal is to settle whatever QUDs the speaker cares
about in order to pursue her broader, non-linguistic goals: to build a relationship, evaluate other
people, convince someone of something, or decide what to do next. Whereas specifying a verb’s
object would always help articulate “the way things are,” leaving it implicit can sometimes facilitate
the speakers’ real-world goals while eliminating superfluous information.
Thus, considering speakers’ real-world goals can help determine how recoverable a verb’s ob-
ject must be in order to be left implicit. For example, this reasoning can help explain why eat with an
IO sometimes sounds fine, and other times strange. In the conversation below, I ate sounds natural
because Phil is not interested in what Teresa ate for lunch, but whether she wants to go to lunch now.
If Teresa adds detail, she may start a friendly chat about quinoa, but this information is superfluous
if the only goal is to decide whether they should go eat.
(19) Phil: Want to have lunch?
Teresa: Thanks but I already ate. vs. Thanks but I already ate quinoa.
In contrast, in the conversation below, I ate sounds strange because Phil wants to evaluate the
new Japanese restaurant. Here, Teresa is far more cooperative interlocutor if she specifies what she
ate and how she felt about it:
(20) Phil: How was that new Japanese restaurant?
Teresa: It was great! I ate there. vs. It was great! I ate this amazing sashimi there.
Thus, by pegging “recoverability” to speakers’ goals, we can explain why the object of eat is
recoverable enough in one context but not in another.
The same sort of logic can shed light on the well-known contrast between eat and devour.
As Resnik shows, an object is more “recoverable” and more likely to be omitted when it is more
predictable given the verb. Since he does not report the statistics on eat and devour in particular,
I performed a simple corpus study to see how they differ. I collected the first 50 hits on CoCA
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(Davies, 2008) for eat and devour when they appeared with explicit objects (eat ice cream, devour
autobiographies). Then I categorized these explicit objects into five categories: food (devour an en-
tire pint of Ben and Jerry’s); metaphorical (devour autobiographies); human (devour human flesh);
non-food substance (devour both acetylene and hydrogen, referring to a hypothetical life form on
the moon Titan); and unclear (devour it where the antecedent was unclear). The results are given
below:




Non-food substance 8 10
Unclear 10 4
This study shows that the object of eat is likely to be a sort of food, whereas the object of
devour could be anything from an autobiography to human flesh. Since eat has a more consistent
set of objects, its object is more recoverable than that of devour. To unite this finding with speak-
ers’ conversational goals, it is easy to imagine a context in which it is important that someone ate
something-or-other without caring whether she ate ice cream or quinoa. In contrast, it is much harder
to imagine a context in which it is important that someone devoured something-or-other without car-
ing whether she devoured a person or an autobiography. Thus, I devoured is often too uninformative
to suit most imaginable discourse goals.
To make these intuitions more precise, I propose that an object may be implicit when it is
recoverable to a relevant degree of precision (RRDP), as defined below:
(21) Proposal: Recoverable to a Relevant Degree of Precision (RRDP)
Let V be a transitive verb and let S1 and S2 be sentences that are identical except . . .
a. In S1, give V an IO and interpret [[V ]] = ∃yλx.xV y
b. In S2, give V an explicit object and interpret [[V ]] = λyλx.xV y
c. The IO of S1 is Recoverable to a Relevant Degree of Precision if interlocutors’ purposes
are not thwarted when S1 is uttered instead of S2.
This proposal draws on two ideas from the philosophical literature. First, in the IO case, the
verb’s object slot is saturated using the “variadic function” proposed by Recanati (2007), which
existentially quantifies over the object and turns the verb into an intransitive one. Second, the term
“thwarting . . . purpose” is inspired by the work of Fara (2000). In her analysis of vagueness, she
points out that some distinctions are relevant for human purposes and others are not. For example,
if she is measuring coffee, a half scoop will make much weaker coffee than a whole scoop, so to use
her words, her purpose would be “thwarted” if she ignored this distinction. In contrast, 12.01 grams
of coffee grounds will make coffee that tastes just the same as if she’d used 12.03 grams of coffee
grounds, so her goal of making coffee would not be thwarted if she ignored this distinction. While
Graff Fara only applies this idea to vague predicates such as tall, I think it is true in general that
people use language to highlight the distinctions that are important for their goals while ignoring
the ones that are not. Thus, I suggest that this idea can also be used to understand whether IOs are
recoverable enough for interlocutors’ purposes. If Teresa just needs to explain that she is not hungry,
her purpose is not thwarted if she uses an IO to obscure whether she ate a burger or quinoa.
2.2 Returning to Goldberg’s Data
Next, I show how this proposal can shed light on why IOs are especially acceptable in the contexts
identified by Goldberg. While Goldberg’s data are surprising for a lexical view of IOs, I think these
data make more sense from a discourse perspective like the one I have just outlined, in which IOs
are allowed when they are recoverable enough for speakers’ goals.
As I mentioned above, Goldberg shows that in certain semantic contexts, even verbs that are
not generally thought to allow IOs do allow them quite productively (13–18). Goldberg argues that
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these contexts are ones where the object is low in discourse prominence and can thus be omitted.
While I agree with this analysis, I think it can be made clearer using the RRDP proposal.
First, in Goldberg’s generic, repetitive, modal and infinitival contexts, the object would be low
in informational content even if it were explicit (please see (13–18)). In all these cases, the IO
does not pick out a single entity, but rather a series of entities across different situations (13–18,
prey killed by different tigers, people killed in different worlds in which the speaker could murder
someone to get a dress, people killed at different times by Scarface, and audience members in all
the worlds where the singer achieves her aims). Since such a series of entities is so abstract and
nonspecific, it would not a very informative contribution to the sentence. In contrast, in a sentence
that describes a single episode, the missing object could be a specific entity such as the tiger killed
the youngest calf, which would be much more informative.
Therefore, when an IO appears in an episodic sentence, more information is lost than when an
IO appears in a sentence describing some sort of iteration. In other words, in a sentence describing
iteration, the opportunity cost (measured in terms of information) of using an IO is lower than
in an episodic sentence. Thus, in these sentences describing iteration, it becomes less likely that
interlocutors’ communicative purposes would be thwarted if the IO version is uttered instead of an
explicit object, perhaps explaining why IOs are more common in these contexts.
Turning next to Goldberg’s emphatic context, I agree with Goldberg that emphasis foregrounds
the verb to the exclusion of the object, but I think this analysis can be strengthened when we in-
corporate speakers’ interests directly into the theory, as the RRDP proposal does. When a speaker
uses emphasis to evaluate an event emotionally, she may use an IO if the verb alone is sufficient for
this evaluation. For example, if the speaker’s goal is to decry someone’s morals, perhaps she only
cares that he killed someone, but doesn’t care who. Thus, the object of kill may be omissible in
an emphatic construction when it’s not relevant for the speaker’s purposes. When we consider the
speaker’s goals in this way, we see that IO is not “low in discourse prominence” as an accidental
fact about emphatic construction, but because such constructions are likely to be ones in which the
speaker finds the object irrelevant. (Finally, I leave contrastive focus for future work.)
So far, I have shown that the RRDP proposal helps to derive Goldberg’s IO-friendly contexts
and clarify why a given IO might be “low in discourse prominence.” Next, I suggest that it also
helps to resolve what Goldberg calls a “paradox” (p. 515) that definite discourse references can be
omitted when they are “highly topical”, for example, when pushing a car, You push, I’ll steer. It
is not clear why such a salient referent would be “low in discourse prominence.” However, on the
current proposal, this data point makes a bit more sense. According to the RRDP proposal, an object
can be omitted when it is recoverable enough for the speaker’s goals. Thus, when the speaker’s
goal does not concern the object of a verb, the standard of recoverability is fairly low. For example,
when Teresa just needs to decline Phil’s invitation, it doesn’t matter what she ate beforehand so she
can omit the object of ate. Phil will not be able to infer from the context what exactly Teresa ate,
but presumably he doesn’t care. In contrast, when the speaker’s goal does concern the object of the
verb, the standard of recoverability is higher. For example, when trying to move a broken car, it does
matter what the speaker wants the hearer to push. However, since the car is so salient in this context,
the hearer will be able to infer what the speaker wants him to push. Thus, in both the eat case and
the push case, the object is recoverable to a relevant degree of precision; the only difference is that
in the eat case that degree is low, whereas in the push case, it is high. Thus, RRDP helps to resolve
Goldberg’s “paradox.”
3 Recoverability Depends on the Community’s Common Ground
So far, I have explored one of two issues related to recoverability: that it is a gradient notion keyed
to interlocutors’ goals. I have shown how this analysis sheds light on that are puzzling for lexical
analyses of IOs. Next, I turn to the second issue related to recoverability: that it is shaped by the
common ground of a particular community of practice. This observation helps to explain many of
the surprising attestations of IOs found on the Web.
As I described above, Fillmore (1986) and Gillon (2006) propose a list of verbs that are sup-
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posed to categorically disallow IOs, but these verbs are attested with IOs in Google searches. Many
of these attestations, I mentioned, come from websites for a specific community of practice for
whom the verb may have special significance. For example, pursue is used with an IO on a discus-
sion board for police officers, who routinely pursue suspects, and vacate appears with an IO on a
blog for people who invest in real estate.
I suggest that these surprising data make sense if we consider how the IO may be more recov-
erable within the common ground of the surrounding community of practice. Since police officers
routinely pursue suspects, as opposed to art history degrees or snow leopards, pursue may work for
them just as eat works for people in general. Just as people normally eat food, police officers gen-
erally pursue suspects, so the object of pursue can be implicit just as that of eat can. To generalize,
I propose that a community is likely to use a verb without an overt/explicit object some of the time
when the community routinely engages in an action that is usually described by a certain verb , and
the action involves an object that can be inferred to a degree that is adequate for speakers’ goals
For the object to be sufficiently inferable, it could be the sort of thing that people generally
only have one of; for example academics usually only have one dissertation each, and regular peo-
ple usually have only one home each, so academics can interpret Sven defended today and people
discussing homes understand We’re going to buy. Alternatively, the object could be a unique thing
upon which everyone in the community performs the action. For example, soccer players all inter-
act with the same ball, so they understand She shoots; debaters in a tournament all interact with the
same motion, so they understand We are proud to oppose; and retail associates who all work at the
same store will understand I closed last night. Finally, the object could be a set of objects within
which it is not always important to make distinctions. For example, when an athlete lifts weights,
she lifts many different weights but doesn’t need to explain which in order to describe the activity.
Thus I lifted is common parlance among athletes. Financiers regularly buy and sell various stocks,
so It’s a good time to sell is interpretable to them. Soccer players and musicians will understand
I haven’t played all week to mean either soccer or music, since each group commonly plays this
abstract mass noun. Finally, the object may be a large space in which it is not always important to
make distinctions. For example, I cleaned or I swept may refer to my apartment or my floors.
Uniting all these cases is the idea of a conventional routine for that community. Within such
a community, the object of these verbs is easier to infer than in the general community, and thus it
makes sense that it is more frequently omitted within these communities.
This analysis is similar in some ways to Levin and Rappaport Hovav’s (2013) discussion of
clean. They show that clean can have an IO when it is used as a manner verb to to describe the
routine actions involved in cleaning (mopping the floor, wiping the counter and so on) but not when
it is a result verb simply indicating that something was made clean in some way or other. But
although both my analysis and theirs involve a routine, my analysis does not distinguish result
verbs from manner verbs. For example, sell is a result verb (requiring that a transaction took place,
without specifying how it happened) but it still allows IOs within the fields of finance and real
estate. Similarly, close is a result verb, and yet if we all work at a store, it is natural for me to say I
closed last night, leaving the object implicit. Thus, while the idea of a routine is central to L&RH’s
analysis and this one, this one predicts that result verbs should sometimes allow IOs, as the data
seem to illustrate.
To test this analysis, I conducted a corpus study in which I compared the uses of IOs in the
general linguistic community to particular sub-communities on the Corpus of Contemporary Amer-
ican English (Davies, 2008). I chose three verbs and three communities in which I thought that verb
would have predictable object for that community: lift in fitness magazines, and buy and sell in fi-
nance magazines. First, I found 200 random hits for each verb on general CoCA (deleting any from
the specific community I was interested in, for example deleting finance magazines for buy and sell)
and counted (using a Python program, after tagging each hit manually) how many times the verb
appeared with an IO. Second, I used CoCA’s scroll menu to search only within “home/health” mag-
azines (there is no specific fitness magazine option) for lift and finance magazines for buy and sell.
(For lift, I deleted hits from home magazines such as Southern Living and kept only the results from
Men’s Health and Shape in order to create a corpus of fitness magazines only.) Among the first
200 hits for each verb within the specific magazine community, I tagged the data and used the same
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Python program to count how many times the verb appeared with an IO. Next, I used a Binomial
Exact Test in R to check whether the general corpus/specific corpus difference was significant. The
Binomial Exact Test is designed for tests with Boolean results, which is appropriate for analyzing
explicit vs. implicit objects. It is also designed to handle data that are not necessarily normally
distributed, like these. For all three verbs, I found that they appeared with IOs far more frequently
in the specific community than in the general corpus (p < 0.01):
Lift Explicit Objects Implicit Objects
General CoCA 196 4
Men’s Health/Shape 179 21
Buy Explicit Objects Implicit Objects
General CoCA 193 7
Finance Mag CoCA 180 20
Sell Explicit Objects Implicit Objects
General CoCA 187 13
Finance Mag CoCA 173 27
These data are consistent with my hypothesis: objects are easier to omit in communities of
practice in which these objects are easier to infer. This finding is not predicted if IOs are simply
listed in the lexicon as available or not, but the finding is expected if IOs are licensed by more
flexible discourse factors.
4 Definite vs. Indefinite IOs
So far, I have explored two factors that affect whether an IO is sufficiently recoverable that it can
be omitted: how much the IO matters for speakers’ goals, and how an IO can become more recov-
erable within a particular community of practice. But before I conclude, I return to an issue that I
mentioned above: the literature’s distinction between “indefinite” and “definite” IOs (Fillmore), or
equivalently between “existential” vs. “anaphoric” IOs (Condoravdi and Gawron, 1996, henceforth
C&G). These researchers argue that the particular verb determines whether its IO will be in one cat-
egory or another (although see Recanati, 2007, for a different view), and they propose diagnostics to
determine whether a verb selects indefinite (existential) or definite (anaphoric) IOs. However, none
of these diagnostics seems as clear as it should be (Recanati, 2007; Scott, 2006).
Fillmore proposes that a verb takes “indefinite” IOs when one can assert a verb while denying
knowledge of the object, whereas a verb takes “definite” IOs when one cannot deny knowledge of
the object. This can be tested with a sluice, as in s/he VERB-ed, but I don’t know what:
(22) a. He ate, but I don’t know what.
b. ??She noticed, but I don’t know what.
However, sometimes the IOs that are supposed to be “definite” do license sluicing, contrary to
this diagnostic. For example, Fillmore says win only allows definite IOs, but in the natural-sounding
Web example below, it licenses sluicing, which only indefinite IOs are supposed to do:
(23) I just won, but I don’t know what. Neither the winning email, nor the claim form mention
which prize I won. [W]
Fillmore also argues that “indefinite” IOs should behave like regular indefinite NPs. Indefinites
can antecede pronouns, as in an example based on (Heim, 1982).
(24) A sailor walked in. She sat down. (pronoun anteceded by indefinite)
Thus, indefinite IOs should license pronouns as well. But this prediction does not seem to hold:
(25) Mark lifted. ??They were heavy.
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This awkward example shows that “indefinite” IOs do not behave like regular indefinites with
respect to pronouns.
Moreover, regular indefinites introduce novel discourse referents, and thus must not be under-
stood as co-referring with a previously mentioned discourse referent. In (26), a book in the second
sentence cannot refer to the book introduced in the first sentence, because the indefinite article con-
veys novelty (Heim, 1982).
(26) I bought a book on Friday, and then read a book all weekend.
If “indefinite” IOs patterned like indefinites, then they should also introduce novel discourse
referents. Thus, Fillmore predicts that an “indefinite” IO should never be understood to co-refer
with a previously mentioned discourse referent. However, in the web examples below, the IOs of
read and eat are most saliently understood as co-referring with the book and pizza mentioned earlier
in those sentences. This inference may be cancelable; (27b) could continue with but we fed the pizza
to the children and ate sandwiches instead; but the point is that there is a salient reading in which
the IO co-refers with a prior discourse referent. Such a reading is not predicted if “indefinite” IOs
are truly indefinite.
(27) a. Your book arrived last week and I’ve been reading all weekend and LOVING it [W]
b. We bought pizza and ate in the park. [W]
Thus, “indefinite” IOs do not behave as indefinites should, questioning Fillmore’s classification.
Moreover, AnderBois (2012) shows that while “indefinite” IOs are supposed to both license sluicing
and introduce novel discourse referents, these two diagnostics do not always line up as they should.
Thus, Fillmore’s classification does not divide the data in a clear way.
The classification system of C&G does not divide the data cleanly either. According to C&G’s
diagnostic, when there is an “existential” IO as in (28a), we infer that John didn’t eat anything, so
it is bizarre to add that he ate grapes. In contrast, when there is an “anaphoric” IO as in (28b), we
infer that John didn’t apply to the particular job that the IO is anaphoric to; but it’s possible that he
applied to a different one.
(28) a. There was bread on the table but John didn’t eat. ??He ate grapes instead.
b. There was a good job available but John didn’t apply. He applied to a different job.
However, it seems that sometimes an “existential” IO (such as the IO of eat) can mean that the
speaker didn’t eat a specific, previously mentioned thing, but instead ate something else:
(29) I’d been feeling sluggish all day. I got home and we made dinner but didn’t eat instead I
ate a piece of bread with some peanut butter about 30 minutes before running. [W]
(30) I absolutely *loathe* buffet food to start with, so that’s why I didn’t eat. I only remember
eating the favor, which was a huge sugar cookie. [W]
Thus it seems that neither the indefinite/definite nor existential/anaphoric distinctions are par-
ticularly clear. That’s why I have considered IOs that might fall into any of these categories. At
least in general, however, some IOs do seem to require an antecedent (I noticed) whereas others do
not (I ate). Thus, while the indefinite/definite and existential/anaphoric distinctions may be hazy,
there is still a real phenomenon to explain. C&G note that no one has every successfully derived this
distinction from a verb’s lexical semantics; I wonder if the distinction could be better explained by
looking at how strongly each verb predicts its object in the sense of Resnik (1993), because it seems
that eat tends to involve food whereas notice could have any number of things as its complement:
a problem, a person, a haircut, or even a CP such as that it was raining. Thus it makes sense that
notice would only allow an IO when this could be recovered from the immediate context, whereas
eat could allow them more generally. Relating this idea to speakers’ goals, it is unlikely to be sig-
nificant in a conversation that someone noticed without knowing whether they noticed an error or
that it was raining, whereas it may be significant that someone ate without knowing whether they
ate a burger or quinoa. I hope that future work will shed more light on these issues.
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5 Conclusion
Exploring two aspects of the “recoverability” criterion for English IOs, I have argued that speakers’
real-world goals influence the degree to which an object must be recoverable, and I have presented
corpus results suggesting that IOs are more frequent in communities where that object is more
recoverable because it forms part of a routine. In both of these ways, I have argued that whether a
verb allows an IO can be negotiated in context as speakers try to maximize the relevant information
conveyed while minimizing unnecessary complexity (Sperber and Wilson, 1986). When the IO is
not relevant, or easy to recover in that particular speech community, it is likely to be omitted. Thus,
this grammatical phenomenon is shaped by speakers’ goals and common ground. Zooming out, I
see IOs as just one example of how social factors influence syntax and semantics (e.g., Clark, 1997).
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